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Contemporary Forum
HAVE THE FOXES BECOME THE GUARDIANS OF THE
CHICKENS?* THE POST-GILMER LEGAL STATUS
OF PREDISPUTE MANDATORY
ARBITRATION AS A
CONDITION OF EMPLOYMENT
JOHN A. GRAY**
A comparson of job application forms used thirty years ago
with forms used today reveals the impact that common law
and statutory law developments have had on the employment re-
lationship. In response to federal and state anti-discrimination
statutes,' today's application forms do not ask for information re-
lated to race, color, national origin, marital status, children or
family plans, religion or age. Employers instead request such in-
formation on a separate form and on a voluntary basis for Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) reporting or
other purposes. Employers today also ask prospective employees
to sign forms created in response to common law developments
* Plainly, it would not comport with the congressional objectives
behind a statute seeking to enforce civil rights protected by Title VII to
allow the very forces that had practiced discrimination to contract away
the right to enforce civil rights in the courts. For federal courts to defer
to arbitral decisions reached by the same combination of forces that
had long perpetuated invidious discrimination would have made the
foxes guardians of the chickens.
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 750 (1981) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
** Professor, Sellinger School of Business and Management, Loyola Col-
lege in Maryland.
1. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988) (unlawful for employer "to fail
to refuse to hire or to discharge any individual ... because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1988) (un-
lawful for employer "to fail to refuse to hire or to discharge any individual ...
because of such individual's age"); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 16 (1991) (unlaw-
ful for employer "[t]o fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual . ..
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, age, national origin, mari-
tal status, or physical or mental handicap unrelated in nature and extent so as to
reasonably preclude the performance of the employment").
(113)
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in the areas of defamation,2 privacy3 and wrongful discharge. 4
These forms include: reference release forms;5 drug and alcohol
testing release forms;6 and forms by which the employee acknowl-
2. See, e.g., Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn.
1986) (holding that employer who acted in accordance with its neutral reference
policy was nonetheless liable for defamation under compulsory self-publication
doctrine).
3. See, e.g., Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp., 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (Ct. App. 1984)
(holding that employer violated implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
by invading privacy rights contractually conferred on employees); Cort v. Bris-
tol-Myers Co., 431 N.E.2d 908 (Mass. 1982) (holding that employer could be
liable for tort of abusive discharge by making obligation to provide personal,
non-job related information condition of employment).
4. See, e.g., Adler v. American Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464 (Md. 1981)
(holding that cause of action for abusive or wrongful discharge by employer of
at-will employee exists when employer's motivation for discharge contravenes
public policy). "Wrongful discharge" refers to a judicially created exception to
the common law employment at will doctrine. Id. at 467. The majority of courts
recognizing a cause of action for wrongful discharge treat the employees' claims
as tort actions. Id. at 468. Other courts, however, have held that an action for
wrongful discharge would lie in contract (breach of an implied in fact contract).
Id. at 467-68. The contract on which the action is grounded could be based on
employer policies and practices, particularly those stated in employee hand-
books, and/or a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The "abusive discharge" tort theory of recovery makes a discharge, whether
actual or constructive, wrongful where the employer's motivation contravenes a
clear mandate of public policy. Id. at 471. Typically, such cases fall into one of
three categories of retaliatory discharge: (1) where an employee refuses to com-
mit an illegal act as a condition of continuing employment; (2) where an em-
ployee refuses to forgo the exercise of a statutory right; or (3) where an
employee refuses to forego the carrying out of a public responsibility. Id. at
468-69.
5. Typically, the form states in part:
I release, promise to hold harmless and covenant not to sue the Com-
pany on the basis of its attempts to obtain any of the forgoing informa-
tion, and I further release, promise to hold harmless and covenant not
to sue any persons, firms, institutions, or agencies providing such infor-
mation to the Company on the basis of their disclosures. I have signed,
this release voluntarily and of my own free will.
MARYLAND CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE MARYLAND EMPLOYER'S GUIDE TO
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY LAw 82 (rev. ed. 1990).
6. Typically, the application form states in part:
I consent to submit to fingerprinting and to take any physical examina-
tions, including but not limited to blood, urine, breath or other exami-
nations or tests for alcohol or drugs or other substance use, that may be
requested by the Company in connection with processing of my appli-
cation for employment, and further agree to take any such examina-
tions that may be requested by the Company during my employment,
with the understanding that these examinations will be performed by a
health care professional designated by the Company, that the Company
assumes no responsibility for advising me of the results of any such
examinations and that any information obtained through such examina-
tions may be retained by the Company and is exclusively the Com-
pany's property.
Id. at 77.
[Vol. 37: p. 113
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edges that the employment relationship is one at will and that em-
ployment policies and procedures, particularly those stated in the
employee handbook, do not constitute binding contract terms. 7
Similarly, in response to the recent Supreme Court decision
in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,8 we may anticipate em-
ployers now adding a mandatory arbitration agreement provision
as a condition of employment. Such a provision would require
both the employee and the employer to resolve any dispute-in-
cluding a statutory anti-discrimination claim-that arises from
employment or the termination of employment by binding arbi-
tration rather than by litigation. This is a result some commenta-
tors had only a short time ago believed unthinkable. 9 Yet, as the
discussion below will illustrate, after Gilmer, where an employer
requires agreement to mandatory arbitration as a condition of
employment, the only employees who likely will retain their right
to litigate statutory employment claims will be union employees
covered by collective bargaining agreements.' 0 Theoretically,
7. Typically, the application form states in part:
I understand that any employment I might be offered is "at will" and of
indefinite duration, and that either I or the Company can terminate that
employment at any time with or without notice for any or no reason,
that no agreement to the contrary will be recognized by the Company
unless made and in writing and signed by the President of the Com-
pany, and that none of the Company's practices or policies are to be
construed as imposing any binding obligations on the Company and
are subject to change and deletion at any time.
Id.
8. 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991) (holding that age discrimination claim against
employer was subject to arbitration under enforceable mandatory arbitration
agreement in securities registration application).
9. See, e.g., G. Richard Shell, Is Arbitration a Just Route?, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 11,
1991, at 13, 13 (discussing potential impact of Supreme Court decision in Gil-
mer). "Until very recently, no one would have thought that such a contract pro-
vision would operate to deny an employee access to a court for something as
important as a violation of a federal anti-discrimination law." Id. Similarly, two
other commentators had previously concluded that employment discrimination
claims could not be subject to mandatory arbitration. Ralph H. Baxter, Jr. &
Evelyn M. Hunt, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Arbitration of Employment Claims, 15
EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 187 (1989). "[W]ith the possible exception of employment discrimi-
nation claims, employers can establish mandatory written arbitration procedures
as the sole method for resolving disputes with their employees" and those arbi-
tration provisions would be enforceable so long as they satisfied "the require-
ments of the United States Arbitration Act or the analogous state arbitration
statute." Id. at 187-88 (emphasis added). Baxter and Hunt, however, fail to
mention, much less discuss, that § 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) ex-
pressly excludes "contracts of employment." See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988)
("[Niothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment . . . of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.") For a discussion of this
exclusionary language, see infra notes 18, 44-48 and accompanying text.
10. McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (holding that
19921
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even public sector employees may be required to arbitrate dis-
putes over possible infringement of constitutional rights if the
employing agency has such a provision as a condition of
employment. I 1
One fear expressed by those opposing mandatory arbitration
provisions in employment contracts is that employers prefer arbi-
tration because it somehow gives them an advantage in that it
provides less protection to employees' rights than does litiga-
tion.12 This fear, however, may not be entirely justified. It is pos-
sible that an employer, rather than seeking an advantage over the
employee, might prefer mandatory arbitration because of its re-
employee's § 1983 claim was not barred by prior arbitration proceeding brought
pursuant to collective bargaining agreement); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (holding that employees' wage claims
under Fair Labor Standards Act were not barred by prior submission of these
claims to contractual dispute-resolution procedures mandated by collective bar-
gaining agreement); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974)
(holding that employee's statutory right to trial de novo under Title VII was not
foreclosed by prior submission of claim to final arbitration under nondiscrimina-
tion clause of collective bargaining agreement). Even employees covered by col-
lective bargaining agreements, however, may be first required to arbitrate those
claims.
11. This inference can be drawn by reading Gilmer in conjunction with Mc-
Donald. The Court, in McDonald, held that an adverse arbitral result under a
collective bargaining agreement on a constitutional claim did not preclude sub-
sequent de novo litigation of the identical issue. McDonald, 466 U.S. at 292.
McDonald had been discharged from the city police force and had then filed a
grievance pursuant to his collective bargaining agreement, contending that
there was "no proper cause" for his discharge. Id. at 285-86. The grievance was
taken to arbitration and the arbitrator ruled against McDonald. Id. at 286. Mc-
Donald then filed a § 1983 action in federal district court, alleging that he was
discharged for exercising his First Amendment rights of freedom of expression
and freedom of association. Id. The jury returned a verdict against the police
chief; this judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
on the grounds that the First Amendment claims were barred by resjudicata and
collateral estoppel. Id. at 286-87. The Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 293.
The Gilmer majority understood this outcome to result not from the nature
of the claim (i.e., constitutional claims, unlike commercial contract claims, are
not amenable to arbitration) but rather from the type of arbitral process (i.e.,
labor or industrial arbitration based on a collective bargaining agreement rather
than an employment arbitration based on an individual contractual agreement).
Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1647. Thus, a public sector employee not covered by a
collective bargaining agreement could be subject to a mandatory arbitration
provision in her employment contract.
12. A similar fear-that somehow arbitration panels are biased in favor of
and/or are controlled by employers-compelled organized labor's objections
more than 65 years ago to the first draft of the then proposed FAA. "[T]he basis
for labor's objection to the bill was the fear that weak unions, or individuals,
would be compelled to submit to arbitration clauses, and that the arbitral deci-
sion-makers would as a practical matter be under the control of the employers."
Brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organi-
zations as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 18, Gilmer (No. 90-18) (cit-
ing 53 A.B.A. REP. 351-52 (1928)).
[Vol. 37: p. 113
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puted efficiency, privacy and finality. Employers also might be
willing to exchange their relative freedom from third-party scru-
tiny of employment decisions for more frequent scrutiny, but a
scrutiny that entails less transactional costs, both monetary and
non-monetary, than litigation.' 3 In addition, a mandatory arbitra-
tion provision can benefit and protect an employee as well as an
employer. For example, an employee, under a mandatory arbitra-
tion agreement, can require an employer to submit adverse em-
ployment decisions to the scrutiny of a neutral third-party-
decisions which otherwise might not be reviewed judicially for a
variety of reasons-in accordance with an arbitral process struc-
tured to protect the employee's procedural and substantive
rights.
Another, perhaps more intuitive, concern over these provi-
sions is that, while an agreement to arbitrate is an agreement to a
choice of a forum and not a surrender or waiver of substantive
statutory rights or remedies,1 4 there is a "take it or leave it" coer-
13. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States of America in Support of the Respondent at 2-3, Gilmer, (No. 90-
18).
A resolution of this issue is of vital concern to the Chamber [of Com-
merce of the United States] and its members, many of whom have indi-
vidual arbitration agreements with at least some of their employees.
These agreements have been adopted in response to the extraordinary
growth of employment-related litigation and the equally extraordinary
increase in the cost of litigating such claims. Voluntary binding arbitra-
tion provides a means for resolving such employment claims in a forum
that is quicker, more efficient, less disruptive, and less expensive, and
one that has the same access to expertise as the judicial forum because
the arbitrator can be selected with an eye to the nature of the claim.
Id.
14. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985) ("By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not
forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than ajudicial, forum."). Substantive rights pro-
vided by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-
634 (1988), may be waived only by complying with the specific statutory require-
ments set forth in The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA), Pub. L.
No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621, 623, 626,
630 (West Supp. 1992). The OWBPA establishes three types of ADEA waivers,
depending on the situation in which the waiver is given or requested: (1) settle-
ment of an ADEA charge or age discrimination lawsuit; (2) a waiver requested in
connection with an exit incentive program; and (3) a waiver given in all other
circumstances. 29 U.S.C. § 626(o. All ADEA waivers must meet the following
minimum requirements: (1) the waiver must be in writing and in language un-
derstandable to the employee; (2) the waiver must expressly provide that the
employee is waiving ADEA rights and claims and only those that may have arisen
before the signing of the waiver and not those that may arise thereafter; (3) the
waiver is given in exchange for additional consideration beyond that to which
the employee is already entitled; (4) the employee must be advised in writing to
consult an attorney before signing the waiver; (5) the employee must be given at
1992]
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cive aspect to the agreement, even though theoretically the em-
ployer is also surrendering its right to take the employee to court.
The concern is that, while it is one thing to make an independent
choice to agree in advance of a dispute to mandatory arbitration,
it is quite another to be required to accept the arbitral forum as a
condition of employment. In effect, with a mandatory arbitration
provision, the employee gives up the right to settle a dispute with
the employer in court in order to obtain or keep work. In addi-
tion, the employee has probably been asked to sign other liability
releases, thereby possibly waiving such rights as reputation and
privacy rights, as a condition for employment.
Several different solutions have been proposed to address
these concerns. Some commentators advocate that employees be
given a choice after they are hired.' 5 This proposal would prevent
possible disadvantage to ajob applicant who does not choose the
alternative to litigation. Others, like Cathy Ventrell-Monsees,
manager of advocacy programs for the American Association for
Retired Persons Worker Equity Department, feel that
"[a]rbitration may have benefits for some employees . . . [b]ut
arbitration must be voluntary and the decision to arbitrate can
only be made after a dispute arises."' 6 Still others maintain that
agreements to arbitrate anti-discrimination claims should never
be enforceable. 17
In response to these varying concerns and proposals, this ar-
least 21 days within which to consider the release; and (6) the waiver must advise
the employee that she/he has a seven day revocation period. Id. In addition,
each of the three situations imposes other, additional requirements. Id.
15. See Joseph E. Herman, Arbitrate, Don't Litigate, at Work, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
14, 1991, at C11. Mr. Herman suggests:
If Congress wants to insure that employees may decide to have
civil rights claims resolved through arbitration or litigation indepen-
dently from their decisions on whether to accept a job, it could provide
that employees must be given a choice after they are hired and that they
could not be dismissed or disadvantaged for not choosing an alterna-
tive to litigation. Once made, the choice would be binding for the du-
ration of the person's employment, unless both parties agreed to a
change. Neither employers nor employees would be forced to agree to
arbitration, but both would be able to establish a binding alternative.
Id.
16. Robert Lewis, A Closing Door? Age Bias Victims See New Threat, NRTA
BULL., May 1991, at 1, 13 (quoting Ventrell-Monsees and discussing likelihood
that Supreme Court decision in Gilmer "could limit the ability of employees al-
leging age discrimination to gain access to federal courts").
17. See, e.g., Shell, supra note 9, at 13-14 (asserting that "[d]iscrimination
claims belong in court"); see also Brief of American Association of Retired Per-
sons as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 16-18, Gilmer (No. 90-18) (ar-
guing that compulsory arbitration is not appropriate forum for resolving
discrimination claims).
118 [Vol. 37: p. 113
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ticle tackles the question of the meaning of Gilmer and its ramifica-
tions for both employees and employers. The Gilmer Court
expressly decided no more than that employees in the securities
industry whose registration agreements include a mandatory arbi-
tration provision must arbitrate age discrimination claims. 8 This
decision, however, could also be understood to support the prop-
osition that, under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 19 any em-
ployer may enforce a mandatory arbitration agreement which was
required as a condition of employment. 20 This conclusion is pre-
mised on the idea that the Gilmer majority's reasoning in favor of
enforceability is not securities industry specific, but rather is just
as applicable to an individual employment agreement as it was to
18. See Gilmer, Ill S. Ct. at 1650. Justice White's statement of the question
would seem to support limiting Gilmer to its precise facts: "The question
presented in this case is whether a claim under the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act of 1967 ... can be subjected to compulsory arbitration pursuant
to an arbitration agreement in a securities registration application." Id. (cita-
tions omitted). The majority's handling of the threshold coverage issue under
§ 1 of the FAA also supports this limitation. See id. at 1651 n.2. Section 1 of the
FAA provides that "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employ-
ment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). Justice White's opinion
stated that "it would be inappropriate to address the scope of the § 1 exclusion
because the arbitration clause being enforced here is not contained in a contract
of employment." Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1651 n.2. For a more detailed discussion
of the threshold coverage issue, see infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
19. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
20. See Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1661 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This potentially
broader view of the Gilmer decision concerned Justices Stevens and Marshall:
"Until today ... the Court has not read § 2 of the FAA as broadly encompassing
disputes arising out of the employment relationship." Id. (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). This broader view also concerned many individuals in the employment
discrimination field. For example, before the Court announced its decision in
Gilmer, Donald Livingston, acting General Counsel of the EEOC, discussed the
implications the case would have for workers in all industries: "This would re-
ally change the legal landscape. It has the potential to be a very, very significant
employment discrimination case." Lewis, supra note 16, at 1. Similarly, Cathy
Ventrell-Monsees, with the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP),
and Counsel of Record for the AARP Amicus Brief in support of Mr. Gilmer,
stated: "In effect, the change would amount to 'closing the courthouse door' to
victims of age bias discrimination .... This would be a major setback in efforts
to stamp out discrimination in the workplace and expand job opportunities for
older workers." Id. In its amicus brief on behalf of Mr. Gilmer, the AARP con-
tended that, if the Supreme Court held that Mr. Gilmer's agreement to arbitrate
included an obligation to arbitrate statutory anti-discrimination claims, "[w]hole
industries will attempt to remove themselves from the purview of the courts and
enforcement agencies by including compulsory arbitration provisions in employ-
ment applications and contracts. The multitude of statutes protecting employ-
ees' rights will be subject to the vagaries of individual arbitrators." Brief Amicus
Curiae of American Association of Retired Persons in Support of Petitioner at 4,
Gilmer (No. 90-18).
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a registration agreement.2'
Part I of this article therefore analyzes the Gilmer opinion in
light of the question of whether non-securities industry employ-
ers may enforce mandatory arbitration provisions as a condition
of employment. Part II deals with the question of what rights em-
ployees have under Gilmer. Part III then addresses the question of
how to limit the FAA's applicability to employment contracts after
Gilmer. Specifically, this author concludes that: (1) after Gilmer,
with the possible exception of unionized employers, any em-
ployer, private sector or public sector, will be able to enforce a
pre-dispute arbitration provision as a condition of employment;
(2) after Gilmer, an employee's basic right is only that the arbitral
process be adequate; and (3) the applicability of Gilmer to employ-
ment contracts can best be precluded by amending the FAA or
the Civil Rights Act.
I. THE GILMER DECISION: EMPLOYER'S PREROGATIVE
Gilmer was a Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) case. Congress
enacted the FAA in 1925 "to reverse the longstanding judicial
hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English
common law and had been adopted by American courts, and to
place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other con-
tracts."2 2 Prior to Gilmer, the Supreme Court had addressed the
enforceability of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration provisions
under the FAA in two situations-securities industry account
agreements with clients23 and commercial agreements between
21. Once you prescind from the threshold coverage issue, the fact that Gil-
mer involved an employment relationship specifically in the securities industry is
irrelevant to the reasoning in support of the outcome. For a discussion of the
reasoning employed by the Gilmer majority, see infra notes 48-63 and accompa-
nying text.
22. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1651 (citing Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470
U.S. 213, 219-20 n.6 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510
n.4 (1974)). The primary substantive provision of the FAA states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidenc-
ing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a contro-
versy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction ... shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
23. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477 (1989) (upholding enforceability of arbitration provision in agreement be-
tween securities brokerage firm and client with regard to claimed violation of
1933 Securities Act); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220 (1987) (upholding enforceability of arbitration provision in agreement be-
tween securities brokerage firm and client with regard to claimed violation of
Rule lOb-5 under Securities Exchange Act of 1934). The fact that securities
[Vol. 37: p. 113
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merchants.2 4 In both the securities industry account agreement
and commercial agreement cases, the Court upheld the enforce-
ability of the agreements. The Court recognized a liberal federal
policy that creates a presumption in favor of arbitration, including
the arbitration of statutory claims. In keeping with this policy, the
Court held that, while "all statutory claims may not be appropri-
industry arbitration is ultimately monitored by and subject to the control of the
SEC was a crucial factor in both cases.
In McMahon, the Court addressed the issue of whether claims brought
under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and RICO must be arbi-
trated in accordance with the terms of a pre-dispute arbitration agreement be-
tween a brokerage firm and its customers. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 222. The
Court concluded that the FAA "mandate[d] enforcement of agreements to arbi-
trate statutory claims," but "[like any statutory directive, the Arbitration Act's
mandate may be overridden by a contrary congressional command." Id. at 226.
Thus, according to the Court, "the McMahons [were required to] demonstrate
that Congress intended to make an exception to the Arbitration Act for claims
arising under RICO and the Exchange Act, an intention discernible from the
text, history, or purposes of the statute." Id. at 227. The Court then concluded
that the McMahons had not met their burden. "[Tlhere is nothing in the text of
the RICO statute that even arguably evinces congressional intent to exclude civil
RICO claims from the dictates of the Arbitration Act. This silence in the text is
matched by silence in the statute's legislative history." Id. at 238. Similarly, the
Court concluded that "Congress did not intend for § 29(a) [of the Exchange
Act] to bar enforcement of all predispute arbitration agreements." Id.
"[W]here the SEC has sufficient statutory authority to ensure that arbitration is
adequate to vindicate Exchange Act rights, enforcement does not effect a waiver
of 'compliance with any provision' of the Exchange Act ... I." d.
In Rodriguez, the Court overruled Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), which
36 years earlier had held unenforceable an agreement to arbitrate a claim arising
under the 1933 Securities Act. Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 484. The Court reasoned
that, in the interim, securities industry arbitration which was now overseen by
the SEC had significantly improved. Id. at 481-82. The Court also reasoned that
Congress' prohibition in § 14 of the Act against enforcing any waiver of rights
conferred by the Act applied only to substantive rights and not to procedural
provisions, because, inter alia, the Act itself allowed a claimant a choice of forums
between the federal courts and the state courts. Id. at 480-82.
24. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614 (1985) (upholding enforceability of arbitration provision in international
agreement between business parties with regard to violations of U.S. antitrust
law); Scherk, 417 U.S. 506 (upholding enforceability of arbitration provision in
international agreement between business persons with regard to violation of
U.S. securities law).
The international dimension was a crucial factor in both of these cases. For
example, in Mitsubishi, the Court addressed the question of the arbitrability of
the claims arising under the Sherman Act "and encompassed within a valid arbi-
tration clause in an agreement embodying an international commercial transac-
tion." Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 616. The Court concluded that, as in Scherk:
[Cloncerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign
and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the interna-
tional commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes
require that we enforce the parties' agreement, even assuming that a
contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic context.
Id at 629.
19921
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ate for arbitration," the burden is on the claimant to show the
congressional intent not to have specific statutory claims subject
to arbitration.2 5 Thus, the enforceability of mandatory arbitra-
tion provisions under the FAA was not a new issue at the time
Gilmer reached the Court.
The enforceability of these provisions in a general employ-
ment context, however, was largely unexplored territory and
neither of the situations previously addressed necessarily man-
dated the result reached by the Court in Gilmer. The context of
both agreements is inherently different from that of an employ-
ment contract. Neither the commercial relationship between
merchants nor the relationship between a securities firm and its
clients is like that between employer and employee. This differ-
ence in the type of relationship is significant. With respect to
commercial merchants, business parties are not in an "adhesive
contract" situation, but rather have an "arm's length relation-
ship." This is a relationship in which both parties hold equal bar-
gaining power when negotiating the terms of an agreement.
Thus, when these parties agree to a broad pre-dispute mandatory
arbitration clause that covers statutory claims, they understanda-
bly should be held to the terms of their agreement. While the
non-negotiable "contract of adhesion" aspect of a mandatory ar-
bitration provision is present in securities industry account agree-
ments with clients, securities industry clients can be considered to
be sufficiently protected in the arbitral process by the oversight
and control of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). This
outside element of control thus could distinguish the required
use of arbitration under these circumstances from its use in em-
ployment relationships.
Prior to Gilmer, the Court had also addressed the issue of the
arbitrability of employment-related statutory claims, at least to
25. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1652. The Court reiterated: "If such an intention
exists, it will be discoverable in the text of the ADEA, its legislative history, or an
'inherent conflict' between arbitration and the ADEA's underlying purposes."
Id. Given the legal complexity of the enforcement schemes for and the socio-
economic significance of this nation's antitrust and securities laws-laws ad-
dressed in McMahon and Mitsubishi-one wonders whether the Court will ever
find any statutory claim not appropriate for arbitration in the absence of an ex-
press congressional intent against arbitration in the text and/or in the legislative
history. Further, one wonders whether the Court, after Gilmer, will ever find an
"inherent conflict" between arbitration and a statute's underlying purpose. For
a discussion of the Court's response to Gilmer's contentions that compulsory
arbitration of ADEA claims would be inconsistent with the statutory framework
and purposes of the ADEA, see infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
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some extent. In three cases, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. ,26 Bar-
rentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. 2 7 and McDonald v. City of
West Branch,28 the Court held that the collective bargaining-based
arbitrability of employment-related statutory claims did not pre-
clude individual employees from subsequently litigating the iden-
tical claims after adverse arbitral results. The special
circumstances of collective bargaining, however, likely limit the
precedential value of these cases to other cases arising in a union
environment. In addition, none of these cases were brought
under the FAA. Thus, Gilmer did present a new issue to the
Court.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation hired Robert Gilmer in
May of 1981, as a Manager of Financial Services.2 9 As a condition
of employment, Gilmer was required to register as a securities
representative with several stock exchanges, including the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 30 His NYSE registration applica-
tion included a provision whereby he agreed to arbitrate "any dis-
pute, claim or controversy" arising out of his employment or
termination of employment. 31 Six years later, at the age of sixty-
two, Gilmer was terminated by Interstate. 32 Gilmer claimed that
Interstate had assigned his duties to a twenty-eight year old wo-
man whom he had trained and that Interstate had fired him be-
26. 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (holding that worker alleging racial discrimination
in violation of Title VII was entitled to trial de novo even though he had previ-
ously asserted identical claim unsuccessfully in arbitration pursuant to collective
bargaining agreement).
27. 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (holding that arbitration under collective bargain-
ing agreement did not preclude subsequent litigation of identical claim under
Fair Labor Standards Act).
28. 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (holding that arbitrator's decision in civil rights
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) had no res judicata or collateral estoppel
effect, regardless of whether parties had agreement to contrary).
29. Gilmer, 11l S. Ct. at 1650.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1650-51. More precisely, Mr. Gilmer's registration application,
which was filed with the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and
entitled "Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer"
(U-4 Form), provided among other things that Gilmer "agreed to arbitrate any
dispute, claim, or controversy" arising between him and Interstate "that [was]
required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions, or by-laws of the organi-
zations with which [he] register[ed]." Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
895 F.2d 195, 196 n. 1 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting paragraph 5 of Gilmer's securi-
ties registration application), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991). Similarly,
NYSE Rule 347 requires arbitration of "any controversy between a registered
representative and any member or member organization arising out of the em-
ployment or termination of employment of such registered representative." Gil-
mer, 111 S. Ct. at 1650-51 (citing App. to Brief for Respondent 1).
32. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1651.
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cause of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).33 Gilmer never filed for arbi-
tration because he felt that arbitration would not provide him a
"fair hearing"-that arbitration panels hearing employment com-
plaints were comprised of industry members whom Gilmer con-
sidered biased in favor of industry employers. 34 Instead, he filed
an age discrimination claim with the EEOC and subsequently
brought suit in the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina. 35 Interstate moved to compel arbitra-
tion under the provisions of Gilmer's registration application and
the FAA.3 6 The district court denied the motion, concluding that
"Congress intended to protect ADEA claimants from the waiver
of a judicial forum." 37 A divided Fourth Circuit panel reversed,
finding "nothing in the text, legislative history, or underlying pur-
poses of the ADEA indicating a congressional intent to preclude
enforcement of arbitration agreements." 38 The Supreme Court
granted Gilmer's petition for a writ of certiorari in order to re-
solve a conflict between the circuits on this issue.39
In his brief, Gilmer made three arguments against the en-
forceability of the mandatory arbitration provision. He first ar-
gued that the Court had recognized in Gardner-Denver and its
progeny that certain claims based on infringements of individual
rights are not subject to compulsory arbitration and that age dis-
crimination should be one of those claims.40 Second, he argued
that Congress, in the Civil Rights Act of 1990, expressly indicated
33. Id.; Peter T. Kilborn, Age Bias Case Could Limit Right of Workers to Sue, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 25, 1991, at Al.
34. Kilborn, supra note 33, at A15.
35. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1651.
36. Id.
37. Id. According to the Supreme Court, the district court had based this
decision on its understanding of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36
(1974). The district court's opinion is unreported.
38. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 197 (1990),
aff'd, 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991).
39. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990). As an
example of the circuit split on this issue, in Nicholson v. CPC Int'l Inc., 877 F.2d
221, 222 (3d Cir. 1989), the Third Circuit held that an ADEA suit could be main-
tained despite a mandatory arbitration provision in an employment contract be-
cause "Congress did not intend that the right under the ADEA to a judicial
forum for protection against age discrimination would be subject to displace-
ment." In contrast, the Fourth Circuit, in finding that Gilmer's arbitration
agreement was enforceable, stated that "we find no congressional intent to pre-
clude enforcement of arbitration agreements in the ADEA's text, its legislative
history, or its underlying purposes . C..." Gilmer, 895 F.2d at 196.
40. Brief on the Merits for Petitioner at 7, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991) (No. 90-18).
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its intent to preclude binding arbitration of employment discrimi-
nation claims. 4' Finally, Gilmer argued that compulsory arbitra-
tion would frustrate Congress' clear intent to end age
discrimination through use of the enforcement scheme it pro-
vided in the ADEA.42 Gilmer conceded that nothing in the text of
the ADEA or its legislative history specifically indicated any con-
gressional intent to preclude arbitration of ADEA claims.43
Rather, his basic contention was that compulsory arbitration of
ADEA claims was inconsistent with the ADEA's statutory frame-
work and purposes.
Before reaching Gilmer's contentions, the Court first had to
address a threshold issue-whether the FAA applied at all to any
employment contract. Section 1 of the FAA provides that "noth-
ing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers en-
gaged in foreign or interstate commerce." '44 The majority opin-
ion discussed this in a footnote, expressly refusing to address the
issue of the scope of the § 1 exclusion "because the arbitration
clause being enforced here is not contained in a contract of em-
ployment," but instead is in a securities representative applica-
tion.45 The dissenting justices, however, took the position that
41. Id. at 13-14. The Civil Rights Act of 1990, as Gilmer acknowledged,
was passed by Congress, but vetoed by President Bush. Id. Gilmer argued that
Congress had made it clear in this proposed legislation that Title VII claimants
were not bound by arbitration and that, because the ADEA is analogous to Title
VII, Congress intended the same for ADEA claims. Id. at 14. According to Gil-
mer's argument, it was not necessary for Congress to preclude arbitration when
the ADEA was enacted because case law at that time precluded arbitration of
statutory claims. Id. at 13.
42. Id. at 14-15. According to Gilmer's argument, because Congress pro-
vided the EEOC with the authority to investigate and attempt to conciliate dis-
crimination charges and because no action could be maintained under the
ADEA or Title VII without first filing with the EEOC, compulsory arbitration of
these claims would undermine the role of the EEOC and conflict with this statu-
tory scheme. Id.
43. Id. at 13.
44. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
45. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1651 n.2. The Court stated:
The record before us does not show and the parties do not contend
that Gilmer's employment agreement with Interstate contained a writ-
ten arbitration clause. Rather, the arbitration clause at issue is in Gil-
mer's securities registration application, which is a contract with the
securities exchanges, not with Interstate. The lower courts addressing
the issue uniformly have concluded that the exclusionary clause in § 1
of the FAA is inapplicable to arbitration clauses contained in such regis-
tration applications .... [W]e therefore hold that § l's exclusionary
language clause does not apply to Gilmer's arbitration agreement.
Consequently, we leave for another day the issue raised by amici curiae.
Id. (citations omitted).
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§ 1 excluded all contracts of employment-collective bargaining
agreements and individual employee contracts-from FAA cover-
age and that this issue should have been addressed. 46 Under the
dissent's construction, there would be no federal policy in favor
of the enforceability of an arbitration provision in an employment
agreement, and the enforceability of an arbitration provision
would have to be decided on a legal basis other than the FAA and
its state counterparts. 47
46. Id. at 1657 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
Marshall, raised three points in his dissent. First,Justice Stevens argued that the
Court should have raised and decided the § 1 coverage issue since "the issue
whether the FAA even covers employment disputes is clearly 'antecedent . . .
and ultimately dispositive.' " Id. at 1658 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Arca-
dia v. Ohio Power Co., 111 S. Ct. 415, 418 (1990)). Further, Justice Stevens
opined that this issue had been adequately briefed by and amply raised with
both parties at oral argument. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent recog-
nized, as had the majority, that Gilmer had not raised the issue of the applicabil-
ity of the FAA to employment contracts at any prior stage of the proceedings,
and that it was amici who first raised this argument in their briefs prior to oral
argument. Id. at 1657 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens nonetheless felt
that the issue should be addressed, as the Court had just that term "decided
cases on grounds not argued in any of the courts below or in the petitions for
certiorari." Id. at 1658 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Stevens
noted that "respondent and its amici had full opportunity to brief and argue the
issue in opposition." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Second, in Justice Stevens' view of the FAA's legislative history, "the pri-
mary concern animating the FAA was the perceived need by the business com-
munity to overturn the common law rule that denied specific enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate in contracts between business entities" and the exclu-
sionary language was intended to exclude agreements between employees and
employers from arbitration. Id. at 1659 (Stevens, J., dissenting). According to
Justice Stevens: "When the FAA was passed in 1925, I doubt that any legislator
who voted for it expected it to apply to statutory claims, to standard form con-
tracts between parties of unequal bargaining power, or to the arbitration of dis-
putes arising out of the employment relationship." Id. at 1661 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens further stated:
I see no reason to limit this exclusion from coverage to arbitration
clauses contained in agreements entitled "Contract of Employment."
... Rather, in my opinion the exclusion in § 1 should be interpreted to
cover any agreements by the employee to arbitrate disputes with the
employer arising out of the employment relationship, particularly
where such agreements to arbitrate are conditions of employment.
Id. at 1659 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Third, not only did Justice Stevens find that the FAA did not apply to em-
ployment-related disputes between employers and employees in general, but he
also found that compulsory arbitration conflicted with the congressional pur-
pose animating the ADEA. Id. at 1660 (Stevens, J., dissenting). One reason in
particular for the conflict, in Justice Stevens' view, is the fact that arbitration
does not provide for class-wide injunctive relief, a remedy essential to eliminate
discrimination in society. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
47. An issue not addressed in this discussion is the meaning, or lack
thereof, of the similarity between the FAA and state arbitration statutes. One
may assume that state legislatures that have adopted the federal § 1 language
excluding "contracts of employment" did so with the intent that the exclusion
126 [Vol. 37: p. 113
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By resolving the FAA § 1 coverage issue as it did, however,
the majority in effect was saying that there was nothing in the
FAA's text or legislative history that precluded arbitration of stat-
utory anti-discrimination claims based on an arbitration provision
in a securities representative application. The question then be-
came whether there was anything in the ADEA's text, legislative
history or enforcement scheme that evidenced a congressional in-
tent to preclude arbitration of ADEA claims. The majority con-
cluded that there was not.48
In reaching this conclusion, the Gilmer majority opinion en-
compassed four lines of reasoning: (1) the compatibility of arbi-
tration with the ADEA's statutory purpose and enforcement
scheme; (2) the adequacy of the NYSE arbitral process; (3) the
contract of adhesion aspect of the arbitration provision; and
(4) the significance of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver and its progeny
to this case.
In the first line of discussion, addressing the compatibility of
arbitration with the ADEA's statutory purpose and enforcement
scheme, the Court found that the statutory purpose and enforce-
ment scheme of the ADEA did not preclude arbitration of ADEA
claims.49 The majority did not perceive any inherent inconsis-
tency between furthering the ADEA's important social policies
and enforcing agreements to arbitrate ADEA claims because, ac-
cording to the majority opinion, both the arbitral and the judicial
forums further a statute's remedial and deterrent functions by
providing a forum for an individual to vindicate his or her specific
dispute.50 Nor was the Court persuaded that enforcing arbitra-
tion would undermine the EEOC's enforcement role. As the ma-
jority pointed out, an individual could still file a charge with and
provide information to the EEOC, or the EEOC could act inde-
pendently in bringing a discrimination action against the em-
ployer (without the filing of a charge by an employee). 51 Further,
would have the same meaning in the state statute as in the federal statute. If not,
the federal statute would preempt a contrary state statute. See Perry v. Thomas,
482 U.S. 483 (1987) (holding that FAA preempted state statute allowing wage
collection lawsuits despite existence of arbitration clause).
48. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1657.
49. Id. at 1653.
50. Id. According to the Court, "[b]oth [arbitration and judicial resolution]
can further broaden social purposes." Id. Just as the Court found in earlier
cases that arbitration was consistent with furthering the important public poli-
cies underlying the Sherman Act, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,
RICO, and the Securities Act of 1933, so also the Court found arbitration to be
consistent with furthering the policies underlying the ADEA. Id.
51. Id.
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according to the majority, individual disputes could be settled
without EEOC involvement-the mere involvement of an admin-
istrative agency in the enforcement of a statute was not sufficient
to preclude arbitration. 52 In addition, the ADEA's flexible ap-
proach to resolution of claims suggested to the Court that "out-
of-court dispute resolution, such as arbitration, is consistent with
the statutory scheme established by Congress."5 "
The Court's second line of discussion focused on the ade-
quacy of the arbitral process. 54 The majority concluded that
NYSE arbitration rules governing the selection of arbitrators and
the FAA provision that courts may overturn arbitration decisions
due to "partiality or corruption in the arbitrators" were adequate
safeguards against potential bias.55 With regard to Gilmer's con-
tention that the limited discovery afforded in arbitration would
make a discrimination claim more difficult to prove, the majority
concluded it would be unlikely that age discrimination claims
would require discovery more extensive than that required by
other statutory claims found to be arbitrable.56
52. Id. The Court gave as an example the fact that "the Securities Ex-
change Commission is heavily involved in the enforcement of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 and the Securities Act of 1933, but we have held that claims
under both of those statutes may be subject to compulsory arbitration." Id.
53. Id. at 1654. The Court suggested that "arbitration is consistent with
Congress' grant of concurrent jurisdiction over ADEA claims to state and fed-
eral courts" because its enforceability serves "to advance the objective of al-
lowing [claimants] a broader right to select the forum for resolving disputes,
whether it be judicial or otherwise." Id. (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shear-
son/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483 (1989)).
54. Gilmer had contended that arbitration panels would be biased against
employee complainants, and that discovery would be more limited than in fed-
eral courts, thereby making it more difficult to prove discrimination. Id. Gilmer
also alleged that, because arbitrators do not issue written opinions, there would
be a resultant lack of public knowledge of employers' discriminatory policies, a
diminished opportunity for appellate review and a stifling of the development of
the law. Id. at 1655. In addition, according to Gilmer, arbitrators cannot pro-
vide for broad equitable relief and class actions. Id.
55. Id. at 1654 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (1988)).
56. Id. The Court again gave as examples of other statutory claims held to
be arbitrable, RICO and antitrust claims. Id. The majority also expressed the
opinion that arbitrators not being bound by the rules of evidence served as a
"counterweight to reduced discovery," and "by agreeing to arbitrate, a party
'trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the sim-
plicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.' " Id. at 1655 (quoting Mit-
subishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985)).
The majority also discussed Gilmer's other contentions in detail, but was
not convinced that what he asserted was realistic or that, if it was, that arbitration
was inadequate for resolving individual ADEA claims. Id. With regard to Gil-
mer's contention that arbitrators not issuing written opinions will result "in a
lack of public knowledge of employers' discriminatory policies, an inability to
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The third line of discussion focused on the unequal bargain-
ing power between employers and employees. According to the
Court, "[m]ere inequality in bargaining power, however, is not a
sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never en-
forceable in the employment context." 57 Because the Court
viewed the FAA's purpose as placing arbitration agreements on
the same footing as other contracts, the Court held that arbitra-
tion agreements are enforceable "save upon such grounds as ex-
ist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 58 In
other words, individual employment contracts with pre-dispute,
mandatory arbitration provisions are enforceable to the same ex-
tent that other contracts of adhesion are enforceable under state
common or statutory law. If the specific provision meets the
state's standards for an enforceable contract of adhesion, then it
will be enforceable.
Finally, the fourth line of discussion distinguished Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver and its progeny. According to the Court, there
were several important distinctions between the Gardner-Denver
line of cases and Gilmer, and therefore, reliance on those cases was
"misplaced. " 59 First, as the Court noted, "those cases did not in-
volve the issue of the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate
obtain effective appellate review, and a stifling of the development of the law,"
the Court noted that NYSE rules do require arbitration awards to be in writing,
that "the award decisions are made available to the public" and that "judicial
decisions addressing ADEA claims will continue to be issued because it is un-
likely that all or even most ADEA claimants will be subject to arbitration agree-
ments." Id.
Gilmer had also contended that "arbitration procedures cannot adequately
further the purposes of the ADEA because they do not provide for broad equita-
ble relief and class actions." Id. In response to this argument, the Court noted
that "arbitrators do have the power to fashion equitable relief' and that "arbitra-
tion agreements will not preclude the EEOC from bringing actions seeking
class-wide and equitable relief." Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1656 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988)). While the Court also noted
that courts should be alert for claims that fraud or overwhelming economic
power led to an agreement to arbitrate-grounds "for the revocation of any con-
tract" the majority did not think that Gilmer, "an experienced businessman, was
coerced or defrauded into agreeing to the arbitration clause in his registration
application." Id.
59. Id. at 1656-57. According to the Court in Gilmer, the issue addressed in
Gardner-Denver was "whether a discharged employee whose grievance had been
arbitrated pursuant to an arbitration clause in a collective-bargaining agreement
was precluded from subsequently bringing a Title VII action based upon the
conduct that was the subject of the grievance." Id. at 1656. The Court noted
that it had stressed in Gardner-Denver "that an employee's contractual rights
under a collective-bargaining agreement are distinct from the employee's statu-
tory Title VII rights ...... Id. In addition, the Court noted in Gilmer that the
"mistrust of the arbitral process" expressed in [Gardner-Denver] had been "un-
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statutory claims," but rather addressed the issue of "whether ar-
bitration of contract-based claims precluded subsequent judicial
resolution of statutory claims." 60 Second, the arbitration in Gard-
ner-Denver and the other two cases was pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement. 6' According to the Court, because the
claimants were represented by the union, whose desire to serve
the collective interests of all employees in the bargaining unit
could adversely affect its representation of the interests of an indi-
vidual, "the tension between collective representation and indi-
vidual statutory rights" was an important concern not applicable
in Gilmer.62 Third, as the Court pointed out, none of these cases
had been decided under the FAA, a statute which "reflects a 'lib-
eral federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.' "63
After having taken the position that a securities representa-
tive application is not a "contract of employment" and therefore
there was no need in this case to discuss and decide the scope of
the FAA § 1 exclusion, the Gilmer majority came to several conclu-
sions: (1) that enforcing mandatory arbitration of ADEA claims
does not conflict with the statutory purpose or enforcement
scheme of the ADEA; (2) that the arbitral process, at least under
current NYSE rules, is adequate for the resolution of ADEA
claims; (3) that a pre-dispute mandatory arbitration provision re-
quired as a condition of employment is an enforceable contract of
adhesion provision if it satisfies relevant state contract law; and
(4) that the Gardner-Denver trilogy of cases, focusing on whether an
arbitral award pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement on
dermined by our recent arbitration decisions." Id. at 1656 & n.5 (quoting Shear-
son/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 231-32 (1987)).
The Court in Gilmer similarly distinguished Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight Sys. Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) and McDonald v. City of West Branch,
466 U.S. 284 (1984). According to the Court, those cases also "involved the
issue whether arbitration under a collective-bargaining agreement precluded a
subsequent statutory claim." Gilmer, Ill S. Ct. at 1656-57. The Court then
went on to state that the statutory claims were not precluded because of "the
difference between contractual rights under a collective-bargaining agreement
and individual statutory rights, the potential disparity in interests between a
union and an employee, and the limited authority and power of labor arbitra-
tors." Id. at 1657.
60. Gilmer, Ill S. Ct. at 1657. "Since the employees [in the Gardner-Denver
line of cases] had not agreed to arbitrate their statutory claims, and the labor
arbitrators were not authorized to resolve such claims, the arbitration in those
cases understandably was held not to preclude subsequent statutory actions."
Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985)).
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an employment statutory claim precludes subsequent de novo liti-
gation of the identical claim, provides no basis for refusing to en-
force a condition of employment arbitration agreement.
The question to be decided in the future is the § 1 exclusion
issue-will the Court limit Gilmer to the securities industry and
comparable industries that require a similar application or will the
Court extend Gilmer to cover individual employment agreements
while continuing to exclude collective bargaining agreements?
Without additional congressional legislation expressly covering
the question of arbitrability, 64 the outcome will turn on how the
Court interprets "contract of employment" in § 1 of the FAA.
If the Court were to find in the future that Congress intended
the § 1 exclusionary language to cover only collective bargaining
agreements in all union situations or exclusively in the transpor-
tation industry (and not individual employment contracts), then
the FAA could be used as the legal basis for enforcing mandatory
arbitration agreements made as a condition of employment. If
the Court interprets the exclusionary language otherwise, then
Gilmer will be a narrow decision, requiring only employees in the
securities industry to arbitrate employment-related disputes
based on a technicality-that the mandatory arbitration provision
is not found formally in their employment agreement but in their
registration application as a securities representative with the
NYSE.
If the Court should hold that the FAA does not exclude indi-
vidual employment contracts, the fourfold reasoning from Gilmer
will apply to employment-related disputes of employees in other
64. After this article was begun, Congress enacted and President Bush
signed into law the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat.
1071, on November 21, 1991. Section 118, entitled, "Alternative Means of Dis-
pute Resolution," states:
Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alter-
native means of dispute resolution, including settlement negotiations,
conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials, and arbitra-
tion, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under the Acts or provi-
sions of Federal law amended by this title.
Id. Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amends Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988), the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988) and the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West Supp. 1991). The clear mean-
ing of § 118 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act is that Congress recognizes the arbi-
trability of discrimination claims arising under the three acts mentioned above.
This section is obviously applicable to individual employment contracts,
although there may be a question of its applicability to arbitrations conducted
pursuant to collective bargaining agreements based on the reasoning in the
Gardner-Denver line of cases.
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industries who have signed employment applications containing a
conspicuous mandatory arbitration provision as a condition of
employment. It is unlikely that any employee could bring a claim
that would not fall within this reasoning. If the statutory purpose
and enforcement schemes of the ADEA, the Sherman Act, the
1933 and 1934 Securities Acts and RICO are not inconsistent
with mandatory arbitration, it is difficult to conceive of a statute
that would have an "inherent conflict" with arbitration. The only
real requirements imposed at that point would seem to be that
the arbitral process utilized be at least as adequate as the NYSE
model discussed in Gilmer and include the same range of remedies
available under the relevant statutory and common law. 65 In ad-
dition, the contract of adhesion aspect of the employment con-
tract would have to comply with state law standards.
The crucial insight to draw from the Gilmer majority's reason-
ing is that, while arbitration of statutory employment claims re-
quired by a collective bargaining agreement does not preclude
subsequent litigation of the same claims, arbitration of statutory
employment claims required by an individual employment agree-
ment is enforceable and would preclude subsequent litigation of
the identical claims. The key difference between Gardner-Denver
and its progeny and FAA cases sustaining arbitrability is not that
the former dealt with statutory employment claims inherently un-
suitable for arbitration (e.g., Title VII) and the latter with statu-
tory non-employment claims (e.g., antitrust, securities), but
rather that the former were labor arbitrations in a collective bar-
gaining context. By focusing on this distinction, the Gilmer major-
ity has provided the basis for upholding the enforceability of
arbitration of statutory claims, absent contrary congressional in-
tent, in individual employment situations. It did so by distin,
guishing Gilmer's situation from that of labor arbitration in a
collective bargaining situation and not by distinguishing arbitra-
tion of employee complaints in the securities industry from that in
other industries. Further, this approach allows the majority,
when it does address the § 1 exclusion issue, to limit the meaning
65. Additional models that would appear to be adequate under Gilmer are
those developed by the American Arbitration Association and the Center for
Public Resources, Inc. Both have features identical, comparable with, or
stronger than the features of the arbitration procedure available for Gilmer's
claim under the NYSE Rules (e.g., specific safeguards against potential arbitra-
tor bias, adequate discovery procedures, written opinions available to the public
and adequate relief). See MODEL EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION PROCEDURES (Am.
Arbitration Ass'n 1990); MODEL AGREEMENT AND MODEL PROCEDURE FOR EM-
PLOYMENT TERMINATION DISPUTE RESOLUTION (Center for Pub. Resources 1990).
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of "contracts of employment" to collective bargaining agree-
ments, an interpretation consistent with Gilmer and the FAA's leg-
islative history.
II. POST GILMER EMPLOYEE RIGHTS: Two OPTIONS
Assuming that Gilmer provides a valid legal basis for the en-
forceability of an arbitration provision as a condition of employ-
ment, what rights does an applicant or employee have? One
option is to submit the claim to arbitration in accordance with the
terms of the employment agreement and then challenge any ad-
verse result in court under the provisions of the FAA that provide
the statutory grounds for vacating an award. 66 The other option
is to refuse to arbitrate and, when the employer seeks court en-
forcement of the arbitration agreement, challenge the validity of
the arbitration clause on state law grounds. The FAA provides
that the validity of an arbitration provision may be challenged on
"such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract." 67 Simultaneously, under either option, an individ-
ual claimant subject to an arbitration agreement is still free to file
a charge with the EEOC.68
III. LIMITING FAA APPLICABILITY
The basic question, of course, is why one would desire to
preclude mandatory arbitration of statutory employment claims.
One argument in favor of preclusion is that, while arbitration of
claims-including statutory claims-arising out of a negotiated
contractual arrangement between business parties makes good
sense, the nature of the employment relationship is radically dif-
ferent from that of other business relationships. 69 Pre-dispute
mandatory arbitration as a condition of employment is not the
result of arm's length negotiation. In addition, the focus of em-
66. See 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3) (Supp. 11 1990) (appeal may be taken from final
arbitration decision). Gilmer had suggested in his brief that judicial review of
arbitration is too limited, but in response to this argument, the Gilmer majority
expressed the view that judicial review " 'is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators
comply with the requirements of the statute' at issue." Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1655
n.4 (quoting Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232
(1987)); see also Brief on the Merits for Petitioner at 20-21, Gilmer (No. 90-18).
67. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
68. See Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1653 ("An individual ADEA claimant subject to
an arbitration agreement will still be free to file a charge with the EEOC, even
though the claimant is not able to institute a private judicial action.").
69. For a discussion of these differences, see supra notes 22-65 and accom-
panying text.
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ployment claims is often not merely monetary damages but issues
of equal employment opportunity and personal dignity.70 It must
be kept in mind, however, that it is possible to have an efficient,
neutral, fully competent arbitral process for employment claims,
even if this process has not been negotiated at arm's length.
Perhaps a stronger argument is that the systematic end result
of mandatory arbitration is not necessarily the reduction ofjustice
in the resolution of individual disputes, but rather a detrimental
impact on the development of substantive statutory law at the ap-
pellate level. Since arbitral decisions need not be based on prece-
dent, are private and are final with limited judicial scrutiny, the
development of the substantive law will become almost exclu-
sively a function of public enforcement agencies. 7 1 In other
words, it is the privacy and finality aspects of arbitration that are
most troubling, rather than the neutrality or competency aspects.
Such a systematic consequence may be desirable in the world of
commercial relationships and securities investors, but may not be
desirable for employer-employee relations.
Prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,72 one
way to attempt to preclude the FAA's applicability to individual
employment contracts would have been to bring an appropriate
§ 1 case, contending that Gilmer should be limited to the securities
industry on the grounds that a securities registration agreement is
not an employment contract and that § 1 of the FAA excludes
"contracts of employment." While at this point in time there is
no indication whether the Court would interpret "contracts of
employment" to exclude individual employment agreements as
well as collective bargaining agreements, the enactment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 has made the point moot with regard to
70. See Shell, supra note 9, at 14.
The use of arbitration may make sense in some commercial contexts,
such as customer-broker disputes, in which routine claims of economic
harm predominate. When employees have claims that they were fired
or passed over because of race, sex or age, however, something beyond
economic harm is at stake. A person's personal dignity and the expec-
tation that he or she will be judged on merit rather than stereotype is a
fundamental characteristic of America's approach to work.
Id.
71. In response to this expanded role and to advance the development of a
coherent body of substantive law to guide arbitrators and lower courts, agencies
would need to be more aggressive in bringing litigation and in appealing ad-
verse results. A side effect of this expansion would most likely be a need for
greater enforcement resources in this effort.
72. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). For a discussion of the Act,
see supra note 64.
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discrimination claims. 73 Further, the Gilmer majority's distinction
between a securities application registration as a condition of em-
ployment and a contract of employment focuses on formality, not
on substance. To enforce arbitration in the securities industry
but not in other industries on this basis does not make sense.
A legislative route to preclude FAA applicability is more cer-
tain. This approach also provides the opportunity to consider
whether to preclude any arbitration-post-dispute as well as pre-
dispute-of any employment claims (statutory, common law or
constitutional) or simply to preclude the enforceability of pre-dis-
pute mandatory arbitration provisions.
There are several legislative alternatives. First, the FAA itself
could be amended to expressly declare that its provisions requir-
ing enforcement of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration do not ap-
ply to any employment agreement. The amendment would have
to be worded to preclude the enforceability of any pre-dispute
mandatory arbitration provision in any contract of employment
on any legal basis unless Congress expressly authorized arbitra-
tion. Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, this
amendment would also preempt any state counterpart to the con-
trary. An alternative legislative approach would be to amend the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 to eliminate § 118 and to substitute lan-
guage excluding the arbitrability of claims arising under the fed-
eral anti-discrimination laws.
73. The legislative history of the FAA indicates that Congress in 1925 in-
tended to enforce commercial arbitration agreements voluntarily arrived at be-
tween merchants as a result of arm's length negotiating and to exclude, at least,
from enforceability under the Act arbitration clauses in collective bargaining
agreements between management and labor involved in transportation indus-
tries. See Tenney Eng'g v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers, 207 F.2d 450,
452 (3d Cir. 1953) (holding that Congress intended FAA § 1 to exclude only
workers engaged in transportation industries). Organized labor objected to the
first draft of the proposed legislation because it could be read to cover disputes
between labor and management. To meet this objection, the exclusionary lan-
guage recommended by then Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover was ad-
ded to § 1. The legislative history is silent about individual employment
contracts. For contrasting versions and interpretations of the legislative history,
compare Brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 17-22, Gilmer (No.
90-18) with Brief of Securities Industry Association, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondent at 18-20, Gilmer (No. 90-18); Brief Amici Curiae of the
Equal Employment Advisory Council and the Professional Employment Re-
search Council in Support of Respondent at 14-16, Gilmer (No. 90-18); Brief on
the Merits for Respondent at 46-50, Gilmer (No. 90-18).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The law does not require arbitration except on the basis of a
signed contractual agreement in writing. Prior to Gilmer, it was
already clear that broad language in an arbitration agreement
(e.g., "any dispute," or "any controversy") would be held to in-
clude statutory claims as well as common law tort and contract
claims. Moreover, the Court had already determined that the
only statutory claims that would not be held to be arbitral were
those that Congress intended not to be arbitrated. The party
claiming such a congressional intent has the burden of establish-
ing it from the statutory language, the legislative history or by
showing an inherent conflict between the statute's purpose and
enforcement scheme and arbitration.74 Given the absence of any
evidence of such a congressional intent in either the text or legis-
lative history of most statutes since 1925, it would seem that
"conflict analysis" would be crucial to those opposing arbitration.
Given, however, the unsuccessful use of "conflict analysis" to es-
tablish congressional intent in recent years, 75 and most recently
in Gilmer,76 one may reasonably conclude that the best way for
those opposing the arbitration of employment-related statutory
claims to limit the FAA's applicability is to ask Congress to amend
the FAA to clarify its § 1 exclusionary language, to amend § 118
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, or to amend both acts.
Since enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 seems to
have rendered the FAA § 1 coverage question moot with regard
to discrimination claims, the only remaining challenges to a pre-
dispute arbitration agreement are under the FAA's judicial review
provisions and state contract law. With regard to judicial review
of an arbitration decision, the role of the courts under the FAA is
to compel arbitration, stay judicial proceedings and review and
enforce arbitral awards. After the Gilmer majority's comments
74. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1652.
75. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490
U.S. 477 (1989) (holding that enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ments furthers purpose and effect of FAA without undermining purpose or ef-
fect of 1933 Securities Act); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482
U.S. 220 (1987) (holding that arbitrability serves purposes of Securities Ex-
change Act and RICO); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 632 (1985) (holding that mere appearance of anti-trust dis-
pute under Sherman Act does not warrant invalidation of arbitration clause;
nothing in nature of federal antitrust laws prohibits parties from agreeing to
arbitrate antitrust claims).
76. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1651-53 (holding that there is no inconsistency be-
tween policies furthered by ADEA and enforcing agreements to arbitrate age
discrimination claims).
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about judicial review of arbitration, we can most likely expect in-
creased and more expansive judicial scrutiny of the arbitral pro-
cess itself. This increased level of scrutiny should provide further
stimulus to the evolution of the law governing arbitration. With
regard to a state law challenge to a mandatory arbitration clause,
§ 2 of the FAA requires that arbitration provisions "shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 77 If the use
of a mandatory arbitration clause in an employment contract is a
contract of adhesion, then it is unenforceable under state law only
on the same grounds and to the same extent as any other contract
of adhesion in that state.
77. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
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